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electorate’s wishes. I show that delegating policy to an independent policy board with
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accountability. Board members are chosen in a partisan, noncooperative environment yet,
in the benchmark model, policy uncertainty is eliminated and the policy rule is replicated.
Thus, a political “invisible hand” is at work—by setting up the policy institution properly
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a world characterized by partisan politics and electoral uncertainty, Alesina [1987]
showed that the economy would experience partisan business cycles.  The implication is that
elections create monetary and fiscal policy uncertainty, which hinders private decision-making
and lowers social welfare.  Since abolishing elections is not an option, a critical question for
democratic societies is how to design the policy-making environment to overcome electoral
uncertainty and minimize partisanship without ignoring the desires of the electorate?
Alternatively, how can society make the policy-maker independent of the electorate's preferences
yet maintain politically accountability?  The purpose of this paper is to show that one
institutional design -- an independent policy board -- works quite well for reducing policy
uncertainty while still allowing recent electoral outcomes to have an influence over the course of
policy.
Three simple ways of reducing electoral/policy uncertainty are: 1) resort to a policy rule
with constitutional status, 2) force the parties to compromise in the setting of policy no matter
who wins the election, 3) delegate the setting of policy to a non-elected, 'independent' policy
authority.
1  A constitutional rule will greatly reduce, if not eliminate, policy uncertainty, but it
essentially ignores the current electorate's policy preferences.  While this may be a desirable
course of action for some policy decisions, such as basic human rights, it tends to be
undemocratic with regards to other policy actions, such as fiscal and monetary policy.
Furthermore, policy rules eliminate discretion and thus the ability to respond to current events,
such as the outcomes of recent elections.
                                                
1. Work by Alesina and Gatti [1995], Waller [1995] and Waller and Walsh [1996] has shown that delegating
monetary policy to a non-elected central banker can substantially reduce policy uncertainty. However, certainty is
gained by having the central bankers essentially behave like a benevolent dictator.2
With regards to bi-partisan cooperation, Alesina [1987, 1988] showed that policy
uncertainty would be reduced if the parties set policy in a cooperative fashion or resorted to
reputation-building in a non-cooperative policy setting environment.  But this early research
begged the more practical question of how to design political institutions to ensure policy
compromise.
More recently, Alesina and Rosenthal [1995, 1996] have developed a theory of divided
government as a method for reducing policy uncertainty. In the early versions of the Alesina
[1987] model the party that wins the election for the executive office sets policy to maximize its
own self-interest (winner-take-all).  In contrast, Alesina and Rosenthal focus on the interaction of
the executive and legislative branches in the setting of policy. In particular, they look at how
‘divided’ government can lead to policy moderation.  Alesina and Rosenthal assume that policy
is the outcome of some unspecified bargaining process but it can be expressed as a weighted
average of the preferred policies of the party holding the executive office and the strength of the
opposition party in the legislature.  The issue they study is how rational voters cast their ballots
in the executive and legislative elections taking into account this ad-hoc policy rule.
2  Alesina
and Rosenthal show that voters will choose to engage in ‘split-ticket’ voting in order to create
divided government and ensure policy compromise.  As a result, policy is more certain and
political risk is lowered. However, policy still exhibits a partisan flavor depending on which
party controls the executive branch (winner-takes-most).  The main conclusion is that in a world
of divided government, policy variability is reduced relative to the winner-take-all model but is
not completely eliminated.
                                                
2. In short, they treat the bargaining outcome over policy as an exogenously determined process and then
endogenously determine the voting outcome.3
Assuming that the executive and legislative branches bargain directly over the setting of
policy is reasonable for many types of policy decisions.  However with other decisions,
particularly monetary policy, society has opted for an alternative policy-making institution -- a
policy board.  Under this system, the executive and legislative branches delegate the policy
decision to an independent but politically appointed ‘board’ whose members serve finite but
overlapping terms of office.
3  Central banks -- such as the Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank, the
proposed ECB, and the newly designed Bank of England -- have similar structures.
4  With a
policy board, the compromise between the two parties now involves bargaining over the
appointees to the board rather than direct bargaining over policy.  The key question is whether or
not this policy-setting institution reduces policy uncertainty.
5 In other words, does the
appointment process make policy more or less partisan?
If policy is delegated to a policy board, how are board members selected?  In the United
States, a common practice for appointing board members at the Federal level is for the President
to nominate a candidate who must be confirmed by the Senate.  If the nominee is confirmed, she
takes a seat on the board.  If the nominee is rejected, a new nominee is offered up and the process
repeats itself. Waller [1992] has argued that this nomination-confirmation process is similar to a
Rubinstein [1982] non-cooperative bargaining problem and analyzed the appointment of
individuals to a policy board.  However, the results of that model are best interpreted as a model
as a one-member board who sets policy unilaterally.  The issue then is the appropriate timing of
                                                
3. Tabellini [1987], Cothren [1988], Waller [1989], Lohmann [1995], Garcia de Paso [1995], Faust [1996]
and Bullard, Schaling and Waller [1997] examine the effects of delegating policy to a policy board on a wide range
of issues. However, none of those models explicitly model the appointment process or do so in a very naïve manner.
4. Other non-monetary policy examples of policy boards are the U.S. Supreme Court and the National Labor
Relations Board.
5. Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) for example motivate uncertainty regarding the future course of monetary
policy as arising from turnover on the FOMC.  Svensson (1995) gives a very interesting account of how the Swedish
Riksbank’s appointment structure creates monetary uncertainty rather than resolving it.4
the board member’s appointment relative to the next election.  The issue of who will be
appointed when policy is made by group decision has not been studied.
6
The board's decision-making process is a key determinant of the dynamics of the
appointment process and the setting of policy.  If the board’s policy action is the one preferred by
the median voter on the board, then filling a vacancy determines today’s median voter and policy
action.  Furthermore, filling a vacancy today also sets the boundaries for the course of future
policy if the appointees serve more than one period.  Thus, today’s appointee affects both the
current and future path of policy.  Expectations of future policy are complicated by the fact that
there is board turnover and elections make future nomination/confirmation roles uncertain.
Consequently, today’s choice of an acceptable board member requires solving for the dynamic
path of appointments in a stochastic bargaining environment.
In this paper, Waller's [1992] two-party bargaining model of appointments is used to
determine whether a policy board reduces or magnifies policy uncertainty.
7  In the benchmark
model it is shown that a policy-board eliminates all policy uncertainty and, in the steady state,
produces the same policy as would occur with a policy rule.  What is surprising about this result
is that it is obtained in a political environment in which parties are concerned only with their own
self-interest, they bargain non-cooperatively and policy is set in a discretionary fashion.  There is
no bi-partisan cooperation or sacrifice of self-interest in the pursuit of the public interest. Yet
policy is perfectly stable and predictable.  In a sense, there is a political 'invisible hand' at work --
                                                
6. There is a developing empirical literature in political science that examines how appointments affect the
direction of policy, see Snyder and Weingast [1994] and Chang [1997], but they do not examine who will be
appointed given an initial set of incumbents on the board.
7. Technically, the appointment decision is modeled as a stochastic dynamic programming problem with the
incumbents on the board representing the state variables and today’s appointee being the control variable.  Elections
determine which party nominates and which confirms and are treated as a ‘black box,’ i.e., are modeled as an N-
state Markov chain.5
by setting up the rules of the game properly and then having the participants pursue their own
self-interest, society achieves its optimal outcome.
An appealing feature of this result is it is achieved without ignoring the wishes of the
current electorate.  Political accountability occurs because the current electorate chooses the
executive who can potentially nominate as partisan a central banker as desired, thereby giving
the current majority what it wants. It is simply not in the executive's self-interest to do so; rather
he will nominate someone for the board whose policy preferences are the same as everyone else
on the board and so the previous policy course is maintained.  Thus, the appointment process
generates political accountability even though the board does not produce the policy desired by
the current majority of voters.
Another nice implication of this result is that elections are 'good' for policy stability, not
'bad' as they are in the basic Alesina model.  The reason is that one of the key assumptions for
obtaining a perfectly stable policy is elections must occur frequently (relative to the length of
board terms).  Frequent elections strengthen the confirming party's bargaining position and thus
help offset the nominating party's first-mover advantage in the bargaining game.  Consequently,
nominees must be closer to the middle in order to ensure confirmation.  Hence, we get the
paradoxical result that more electoral uncertainty reduces policy uncertainty.
The key institutional features that are responsible for the benchmark result are:
1.  Frequent elections and/or long board terms.
2.  Constant election probabilities (no incumbent bias or state dependency).
3.  Parties have linear utility  (risk neutrality).
4.  Perpetually divided government.
In the latter part of the paper, the benchmark board model is amended to see how relaxing each
of these assumptions affects the basic result.  It is shown that relaxing any one of the
assumptions breaks down the perfectly stable policy outcome. In general, however, even if6
assumptions 1) - 4) do not hold, policy is still more stable than in the Alesina [1987] and
Alesina-Rosenthal [1996] models. Furthermore, it is also demonstrated that each of these
problems can typically be overcome by lengthening board terms and/or expanding the board size.
While it is not surprising that breaking 1), 2) and 4) creates policy instability, the result
that risk aversion leads to greater instability of policy is surprising.  Such a result is counter
Alesina's [1987] finding that risk aversion reduces policy variability.  The reason for the
conflicting results is that Alesina relies on cooperative bargaining (Nash) to determine the policy
outcome, while non-cooperative bargaining  (Rubinstein) is used here.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II, the political
environment, the parties' policy preferences and the board structure are described.  Section III
contains models of policy without a board: Alesina's winner-take-all, Alesina and Rosenthal's
winner-takes-most and a policy rule.  In Section IV, the benchmark board model and its solution
are presented. Section V presents the results when assumptions 1) - 4) are relaxed in the board
model.  Finally, Section VI contains concluding comments and directions of future research.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
To study the appointment problem the following elements of the model need to be
specified:
A.  The political environment.
B.  The parties' policy preferences.
C.  The structure of the policy board and board members' policy preferences.
D.  The set of acceptable candidates for the board
E.  Time between elections and the parties' election probabilities.7
A.  The Political Environment
Following Waller [1992], society elects an executive (the President) to serve several
administrative functions, including the nomination of members to a policy-making board.  Voters
choose the leader from one of two parties, party 0 and party 1.  Elections are held every m
periods where m will be assumed to equal 1 or 3 in the analysis that follows.  Although the
President nominates individuals to serve on the board, the legislative body (the Senate) must
confirm nominations.  Control of the confirming body is also determined by elections that occur
simultaneously with the presidential election.
8 The probabilities associated with election
outcomes are assumed to be independent of the policies followed by the board.
9 It is further
assumed that there is complete party discipline across legislative bodies and within. This
assumption is important for solving the model since it eliminates the need to determine intra-
party negotiations and will be maintained throughout the paper.  With regards to the nomination
process, it is assumed that only one nomination for a particular seat can occur per period.  In
short, if a nominee for a seat is rejected, a new nominee for that particular seat cannot be offered
up until the next period.  However, multiple nominations for multiple vacancies are feasible in a
given period.  Finally, if an election occurs at the start of period t, then period t nominations
occur immediately after the election.
An important aspect of the nomination-confirmation process is that it gives the
nominating party a first-mover advantage. This may be a desirable feature in a democracy since
society's attitude may be that the winner of the presidential election should have more influence
                                                
8. This is not a restrictive assumption and could be modified.  Simultaneity of elections simplifies the model
for obtaining analytical and numerical results.  Confirmation is a by majority rule hence, unlike Alesina and
Rosenthal, vote share beyond 50+ % is not relevant.
9. This assumption could be justified if one views voting as a multi-dimensional problem and voters cast their
ballots based on other policy issues (abortion rights) than the board’s policy (monetary growth rates).8
in the policy process than the legislative branch since the president must win a national election
whereas legislators do not.  The issue is whether or not this first-mover advantage translates into
partisan policy and policy uncertainty.
B. Party Objectives
Parties are assumed to derive utility from the policy chosen by the board.  Let xt be the
policy set in period t with xt Î[0,1].
10  Each party wants to have policy chosen such that:
(1) 0,1   =   i for                   )] ( ) ( [ max ) ( 1 1 , , + + + = t t i t t i x t t i I V E x u I V
t
b
where Vi,t(×) is the value function for party i, It denotes the incumbents on the board at time t, b is
the discount factor common to both parties and Et denotes the expectations operator conditional
on information available at time t.
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From the utility functions, party 1's most preferred policy is xt = 1 while party 0's most preferred
policy is xt = 0.  It is assumed that if no policy action is enacted in period t, then no output is
produced and the payoff to each party is zero. Alternative formulations of the model could
                                                
10. Policy can be thought of as inflation targets, attitudes towards regulation, business  vs. labor interests, etc.9
specify the status quo (last period's policy) as the policy output in period t if no action is
undertaken.
Through the nomination and confirmation process, the parties choose individuals of type
yt in period t to fill vacancies that arise on the policy board.  The individual's type reflects the
policy action she would enact if she were allowed to set policy.  It is assumed that yt Î [0,1].
There is complete information regarding an individual's type and the individual's policy
preferences are assumed to be temporally stable.  Finally, once appointed, a board member
cannot be removed.
 C.  The Structure of the Policy Board
It is assumed that there are 3 seats on the policy board and each seat has a 3 period term
length. The model can actually be solved for a board of any size but the solution expressions for
n > 3 board members are analytically unwieldy.
11  Hence, only a discussion of the case of n > 3
board members will be presented here. Board terms are assumed to be staggered and overlap by
one period.  Consequently, one vacancy arises every period from the expiration of a term.
Vacancies arising for reasons other than rejection of a nominee (death, resignation, etc.) are
ignored for analytical tractability.
The board sets policy according to the median voter rule.  If every seat on the board is
filled and the number of seats is odd, the median voter is easy to determine.  In this case, xt = ymt
where ymt denotes the preferred policy of the median board member in period t and
ym,t Î [yt, yt-1, yt-2].  If vacancies are not filled for some reason in the current period, then the
existing members of the board set policy.  If two members are on the board, then it is assumed
that the two members “split the difference” and xt is a weighted average of their respective
                                                
11. Nevertheless, it can be simulated relatively easily.10
policy positions with the parameter a being the weight attached to the most recently appointed
incumbent’s policy position.
12  Finally, if only one member is on the board, then that member
determines policy unilaterally and sets xt equal to her preferred policy.  Thus, today's policy is a
function of today's board composition, Bt, and can be written as xt = xt(Bt).  The assumption that
policy is made by the median voter means that policy is set in a discretionary fashion -- whoever
is on the board sets policy however they want.
The assumptions regarding the board structure and the determination of policy enable the
parties’ value functions to be written as:
(3) 0,1   =   i for                   )] ( )) ( ( [ max ) ( 1 1 , ,
t
+ + Î + Î = t t t i t t t t i y t t i I y V E B y x u I V b .
D.  Acceptable Candidates
Given the assumptions regarding the parties' preferences, the structure of the board and
the setting of policy, we can determine the set of acceptable candidates.  The choice of an
individual today not only determines who the median voter is today but also influences who the
median voter will be in the future.  Thus, the choice is either to accept a candidate today and the
policies associated with having that person on the board today and in the future, or to leave the
seat open, have policy set by today's board members and wait to appoint an acceptable candidate
tomorrow.   Acceptable candidates for party i are those values of yt that satisfy the following
condition:
(4)
V I u x yB E V yI u x yB E V yI it t y itt t t i t t t itt t t i t t t 1
t
,, , ( ) max[ ( ( )) ( )] ( ( )) ( )) =Î + Î ³ Ï + Ï ++ ++ bb 11 1    .
                                                
12. This eliminates the need to analyze intra-board bargaining when there are an even number of board
members. von Hagen [1995] has studied intra-board bargaining but ignores appointment issues.11
The left-hand side of the inequality in (4) is the value of having candidate yt on today's
board, yt Î Bt, and having today's policy be influenced by yt being on the board, xt(yt Î Bt), and
play the same appointment game tomorrow with yt now being part of tomorrow's incumbent set,
yt Î It+1.  Party i will only accept candidate yt if this payoff is greater than or equal to the payoff
from leaving the seat vacant today, yt Ï Bt, having today's incumbents set policy, xt(yt Ï Bt), and
repeat the process tomorrow with an incumbent set that does not have someone appointed from
period t, yt Ï It+1.  Define a party's minimally acceptable candidate as the value of yt who
satisfies equation (4) with equality.
If one party controls both the Presidency and the Senate, then the candidate must satisfy
condition (4) for that party only.
13  If one party controls the Presidency and the other controls the
Senate, then an appointee must satisfy this condition for both parties.  Thus, the problem
confronting each party is to solve (3) subject to (4).  However, only the nominating party is
allowed to choose the value of yt.  The confirming party can only confirm or reject the nominee.
Therefore, the nominating party chooses a value of yt to solve (3) such that (4) is satisfied for the
party controlling the Presidency and the party controlling the Senate.  Since the nominating party
wants to appoint as partisan a board member as possible, it will nominate the confirming party's
minimally acceptable candidate.  Thus, the nominating party will offer a candidate who solves
(4) with equality for the confirming party.  As a result, no nominees will be rejected in
equilibrium and the board will always be at full strength.
Intuitively, the nominating party is trying to exploit the confirming party's willingness to
trade off policy payoffs today against policy payoffs in the future.  The confirming party may be
willing to accept a less preferable appointee (and policy outcome) today for two reasons: 1) to12
avoid a worse, or more uncertain, policy outcome in the future if the current vacancy is not filled,
and 2) discounting lowers the value of achieving a more preferred policy outcome in the future.
Consequently, parameters such as the discount factor, a and a party's degree of risk aversion will
determine each party's inter-temporal terms of trade and thus the policy preferences of today's
appointee.
E.  Electoral Cycles, Multiple Vacancies and Election Probabilities
The last three structural details needed to solve this dynamic optimization problem are
the length of the electoral cycle (time between elections), the process by which multiple
vacancies are filled and the probability structure of election outcomes.
With regards to the length of the electoral cycle, what matters is whether the board terms
are longer than the electoral cycle or less than or equal to the electoral cycle.  The benchmark
model has frequent elections (every period). Later, the case of infrequent elections will be
considered (when the electoral cycle is the same length as the board terms). Regarding multiple
vacancies, I focus on the case in which only vacancies associated with a full term in office are
filled while partial terms are left vacant.  The main reason for this assumption is brevity -- it
reduces the scope of the problem since it eliminates the need for determining the types of
candidates who are acceptable to fill partial terms on the board.  However, it is important to note
that the method for dealing with multiple vacancies does not change the solution for the
equilibrium appointment function when the board is at full strength (which it will be in
equilibrium since nominees are never rejected).  Consequently, the steady-state appointee is
                                                                                                                                                         
13. This is due to the assumption that all party members have homogeneous policy preferences and majority
rule in the Senate is all that is necessary for confirmation.13
unaffected as well.  The method for filling multiple vacancies does affect the points at which the
appointment function is evaluated should the board ever fall below full strength.
14
Since the outcomes of the elections are assumed to be random events, the probability
space for election outcomes needs to be specified.  The election state space depends on whether
or not unified government is allowed.  In the benchmark board model, it is assumed that there is
perpetually divided government and thus there are only two election states: party 1 nominates
and 0 confirms or vice versa.  With unified government, there are four possible
nomination/confirmation states.
Once the election state space is determined the remaining issue is whether or not election
outcomes are time invariant.   In general, election outcomes will be state-dependent or display
persistence, i.e.; a party's probability of winning the next presidential election depends on
whether it already holds the presidency.  There is considerable evidence of electoral persistence
in the form of an incumbent bias where the incumbent party has a greater than 50 percent chance
of winning the next presidential election. In the benchmark model, election probabilities are
assumed to be constant. In latter sections of the paper, the effects of time varying election
probabilities and electoral persistence will be discussed. Under the assumption of constant
election probabilities, let p denote party 1's probability of winning the next presidential election
and 1-p be party 0's probability of winning.
                                                
14. With multiple vacancies, the confirming party requires that it be offered a sequence of appointees or a
single package of appointees that gives it as much utility as leaving the seats vacant and having the incumbents on
the board set policy. This required payoff is invariant of the method for filling multiple vacancies but it does impose
a set of arbitrage conditions on the types of candidates who can fill the partial terms according to the method chosen
for filling the multiple vacancies.14
III.  Policy without a Board
Since the objective is to determine how successful a policy board is at smoothing the
movements in policy and minimizing partisanship, it is useful to describe the policy outcome in a
model without a board. Three such models will be considered: the Alesina "winner-take-all"
model, the Alesina-Rosenthal "winner-takes-most" model and a policy rule.  In these policy
regimes, if party i controls the executive branch and party j controls the legislative branch policy
is set at xt = qi. The parameters q0 and q1 are assumed to be exogenously determined.  It will be
assumed that 0 £ q0 < q1 £ 1. If we set q0 = 0 and q1 = 1, then we have the winner-take-all
regime.
15    If 0 < q0 < q1 < 1 we have the equivalent of Alesina and Rosenthal model where
divided government moderates the setting of policy but it will still be partisan towards the party
that controls the executive branch.  In the simulation work, the winner-take-all regime will be
used as the norm for comparison to the board model. The reason is to see how well a policy-
board works in the most partisan world; if it works well in an extremely partisan environment,
then any other institutional arrangements which moderate policy in the absence of a board will
only be strengthened by delegating policy to an independent board.
Under either of these regimes, policy bounces around between, 0, q0, q1, 1 depending on
the outcomes of the most recent executive and legislative elections.  It is this variability of policy
that the board structure is attempting to overcome.  An important interpretation of these regimes,
that will be used later, is that they are equivalent to shutting down the board -- there are no
incumbents and policy control reverts back to the executive and legislative branches.
Accordingly, we can write each party’s value function in the policy-by-government world as
                                                
15  This will also be the policy outcome if i nominates with unified government.15
(5)
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where the null symbol denotes no board incumbents and Fit is an indicator variable equal to qi if
party i nominates in period t.  The max operator only applies to the first term since xt is assumed
to have no impact on decisions in period t+1 and beyond.  In short, this value function
corresponds to a repeated one-shot version of an ultimatum game.
By recursion and the assumptions made regarding election probabilities, Vi,t(Æ) can be
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The unconditional expectation of policy would be E(xt ) = pq1+ (1-p) q0 and the
unconditional variance would be Var(xt) = p(1 - p)( q1- q0)
2.
One can think of a policy rule as a constitutional amendment that sets xt = E(xt) for all t.
Such an outcome is equivalent to what would arise from a cooperative Nash bargaining
environment. Adopting a policy rule would produce the long-run average policy while
eliminating all policy variability.  Furthermore, it would raise total party welfare if the utility
functions are concave.  However, as was mentioned earlier, such an arrangement completely
ignores the current wishes of the electorate since policy does not respond to the current power
structure of the government.  For example, if party 1 controlled both branches of the government,16
policy is still reflecting the preferences of party 0 even if it is presently a minority party.
Consequently, stability comes at the cost of removing policy from the democratic process. A
more appealing institutional design would produce the same level of stability but at least provide
the potential for the current electoral outcomes to influence the direction of policy.  It is to such
an institution that we now turn.
IV. Policy with a Board -- A Benchmark Model
A.   The Set of Acceptable Appointees
Since policy moderation is most likely to occur with divided government, it is interesting
to see how well the board reduces policy variability with perpetually divided government.  If it
fails miserably in this case, there is no hope it will generate moderate policies under unified
government.  In the solutions that follow, the parameters q0 and q1 are the parties' threat points –
either party can choose to shut down the board by refusing to nominate or confirm any candidate.
With a maximum size of three members, the board will vacate in two periods or less and policy
control reverts back to the government. Hence, the parties are deciding period-by-period whether
or not to maintain the policy institution or eliminate it.
The benchmark board model will be solved under the following assumptions:
1.  Perpetually divided government.
2.  Linear utility.
3.  Constant election probabilities.
4.  Frequent elections or long board terms.
The reason for choosing these assumptions is that, as will be demonstrated below, they are
necessary conditions for the existence of a steady-state equilibrium.
If there is unified government and party i controls the government, it will nominate and
confirm purely partisan board members and yt = i, i = 0,1.  For yt to be between zero and one,17
divided government must occur. Furthermore, if unified government can occur with positive
probability but less than one, then there can be no steady-state appointee or policy.  Thus, in
order to obtain an interior value for yt and to have the possibility of a steady state there must be
perpetually divided government.
It is shown in Appendix A that the set of acceptable candidates, yt, satisfying equation (4)
when both board incumbents are present must satisfy the following condition:
(7)
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for i = 0,1 where the parameter a is the weight placed on the young incumbent's policy position
when two board members set policy.  The set of acceptable candidates are those values of yt
satisfying (7) for both parties.
16
Equation (7) has a straightforward interpretation.  The left-hand side is the stream of
utility from appointing candidate yt today and then initiating the process of shutting down the
board in period t+1. The right-hand side of (7) is the stream of utility received from beginning
the board shutdown today.  Hence, accepting a candidate today must be preferred to shutting
down the board.  By putting yt on the board today, party i receives utility associated with the
policy desired by the median voter of the set [yt, yt-1, yt-2].  In period t+1, policy will be a
weighted average of yt and yt-1 and the parties get discounted utility from that policy. In period
t+2, yt sets policy unilaterally and the parties receive discounted utility from that policy. From
period t+3 on policy is set by the government.  The terms on the right-hand side of (7) are the
policy payoffs from having the incumbents set policy today, having yt-1 set policy in period t+1
                                                
16. For all linear and concave utility functions, this will be a non-empty set.18
and then have policy revert to government control in period t+2.  Since the government has
control of policy from period t+3 onwards with either strategy, payoffs after t+2 cancel out.
Since both parties have the power to start shutting down the board today, doing so is the
threat point for each party and the payoff stream associated with that strategy is the minimum
payoff from playing the appointment game. Consequently, each party must get at least the utility
payoff associated with the threat point in order to continue playing the appointment game.
Knowing this, the nominating party will choose to offer the confirming party a candidate today
such that (7) holds with equality for the confirming party.  Essentially, the nominating party
offers a candidate such that the confirming party is indifferent between shutting down the board
and accepting the offer.  As a result, in this non-cooperative bargaining environment, the
nominating party extracts as much surplus appointment as possible from the confirming party
with today's appointment.
There are several key points to make regarding equation (7).  First, setting (7) to equality
yields the reduced-form solution for ym,t but not for yt. The exact solution of yt depends on who
the median voter will be today as a result of appointing someone today. To obtain the
equilibrium value of yt, we need to substitute each of the possible values for ym,t -- yt, yt-1, yt-2  --
into (7), solve for the value of yt associated with each of these possible values and then determine
the conditions under which this will be today's appointee.  Hence, in every period there will be
three possible equilibrium expressions for yt depending on who will be today's median voter.  In
general, it is not possible to obtain analytical expressions from (7) for yt but with linear utility it
is straightforward to do so.  Consequently, in the benchmark model, linear utility will be
assumed in order to do theoretical analysis of the model's dynamics.  With non-linear utility,
numerical simulations will be done to study the properties of the equilibrium policy path.19
Second, and not surprisingly, policy is path dependent -- policy today is a function of
previous appointments and thus previous policies.  Unlike Waller’s [1992] result, appointee
types are path dependent and a function of current board members.  Nevertheless, although
policy is path dependent, the functional form for determining policy is temporally stable. This
implies that there is a fair degree of predictability as to the types of board members who will be
appointed given the policy preferences of the incumbent board members and which party is
confirming.
Third, given the intuition behind (7) it can be shown that a similar condition would apply
to any size board.  For example, if the board was made up of five members serving overlapping,
five-year terms (which is the structure of the National Labor Relations Board, for example), then
(7) would contain five terms on each side of the inequality.  The interpretation of each term is the
same as that used in the three-member board case.  The problem with moving to five board
members is that, unlike the three solutions for yt arising in the three-member example, there are
1620 solutions for yt!  The left-hand side would have 5 possible outcomes for the five-member
board, 6 possible outcomes with four-member board, and 3 possible outcomes with the three-
member board.
17  Hence the left-hand side has 90 combinations.  The right-hand side would have
18, which makes 1620 total combinations and thus 1620 solutions for yt.  Studying the five-
member board analytically is a bit unwieldy to say the least but could be done numerically. A
seven-member board such as the Federal Reserve Board of Governors would generate 10,800
solutions for yt.
                                                
17. With the four-member board, policy is a weighted average of the middle two board members and there are
six unique combinations with four members.20
B.  Steady-state Policy in the Benchmark Board Model
Equation (7) determines the dynamics of the appointment/policy path for an initial set of
incumbents on the board.  A natural question to ask is whether or not a steady-state
appointee/policy exists in the benchmark board model.  If so, then all policy uncertainty will be
eliminated and partisan business cycles of the Alesina [1987] variety will not occur.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to see how the steady-state policy in the board model
compares to the policy rule proposed in the previous section.
Given that the nominating party will choose to offer a candidate who satisfies (7) with
equality for the confirming party, a steady-state appointee would have to satisfy (7) with equality
for both parties, i.e., the steady-state appointee is made regardless of the identity of the
confirming party.  Substituting in y for all yt-j " j and setting (7) to equality for i = 0,1 yields the
following two conditions that y must satisfy:
(8)
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With all board members being the same, the only difference between the strategies associated
with the right and left-hand sides of (7) is the payoff in the last period.  Equation (8) says that the
steady-state appointee equates the last period payoffs.
It is obvious from (8) that a necessary condition for a steady state to exist is that the
expectation on the right-hand side be constant over time.  This expectation term is the payoff the
parties receive two periods from now if the board is shut down and policy control reverts back to
the executive and legislative branches.  The expected payoff in turn depends on who controls the
executive branch and who controls the legislative branch two periods from now.  In order for this21
expectation to be constant, the probabilities of party i controlling the executive branch must be
constant, which means election probabilities must be time invariant.  In the benchmark case, this
is the underlying assumption.  Furthermore, this expectation will only be time invariant if at least
one election occurs in the next two periods for any t.  In other words, elections have to occur
every period or at least every other period.  Otherwise, the nominating and confirming roles two
periods from now will be whatever there are at time t.  This means the elections must occur
frequently relative to the length of the board terms.  Thus, a necessary condition for the
expectation term to be time invariant is that the electoral cycle be shorter than board terms.
Again, this is the assumed structure in the benchmark.
Given these assumptions on the expectation of future policy and the assumptions made
on the utility functions in (2), equation (8) becomes
(8')
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For any utility function satisfying u' > 0, u'' £ 0, (8') implies
(9)
























The only way for y to be a steady state is if it satisfies both expressions in (9') with equality,
which will hold if and only if the utility functions are linear.  With linear utility the steady-state
policy is given by:22
(10) 0 1 ) 1 ( q q p p y x - + = = .
Note that the steady-state policy is the same as the proposed constitutional rule and so all
policy variability has been eliminated.  Consequently, there is no policy uncertainty and the
partisan business cycle has been eliminated.  The advantage of this institutional set-up over a
policy rule is that the current electorate's wishes are not completely ignored since the outcome of
the elections determines which party nominates.  In principle, the nominating party has a first-
mover advantage that allows it to appoint someone whose policy choice reflects the position of
the victorious party.  It was argued earlier that this first-mover advantage is a form of political
accountability.  However, the system of checks and balances created by the confirmation process
ensures that the parties compromise.  Once they reach the steady-state policy, neither side is able
to force the other to deviate from it.  The end result is that society achieves perfect policy
stability with political accountability. Furthermore, the constitutional rule is achieved even
though policy is set in a purely discretionary fashion.  This is just an example of the old adage
that discretion is preferred to rules because discretion can always replicate the rule.
Another important point regarding (9') is that it was derived using only the last period
payoffs in (7).  If the expectation term in (8) is time stationary, then the expressions in (8) - (9')
apply for a board of any size.  So, if a steady state exists, it is the same for boards of all sizes.
Board size only affects the dynamic path to the steady state in the benchmark model but not the
steady-state policy itself.
A last point to make regarding (9') is that if parties are risk averse, no steady state exists.
It then follows that policy will fluctuate even if all the other assumptions of the benchmark
model hold.  Consequently, risk aversion creates policy uncertainty and instability. Finding that
risk aversion leads to greater policy variability is certainly a surprising result, particularly given23
Alesina's [1987] results suggesting that it should reduce policy fluctuations.  The reason for the
difference is that Alesina uses a cooperative bargaining approach (Nash bargaining) while a non-
cooperative bargaining framework is used here.  To see how this matters, examine (8) above.
With concave utility, party 1 would be willing to accept a minimum value of y, y1, and party 0
would be willing to accept a maximum value of y, y0, such that
(11)











Again, rewriting the last line of (11) yields
(11') 0 0 1 1 ) 1 ( y p p y < - + < q q .
These conditions merely reflect the fact that each party would be willing to accept a less
preferred but certain candidate on the board to avoid the policy risk associated with having
policy revert back to unknown executive control.  If the parties are risk averse we obtain a set of
possible steady-state appointees rather than a singleton.  In a cooperative bargaining environment
with bargaining weights equal to the election probabilities, the parties would agree on the policy
outcome  0 1 ) 1 ( q q p p y x - + = = .  But in a non-cooperative bargaining environment, the
nominating party knows the confirming party is willing to pay a risk premium to avoid policy
uncertainty and extracts it.
So even if we happen to be at the point yt-1 = yt-2 = pq1 + (1-p)q0, yt will not be since the
nominating party i will push yt towards the confirming party's value of yi.  Thus, the parties'
willingness to pay a policy risk premium, and the nominating party's desire to extract it, breaks
down the proposed steady-state equilibrium and creates policy variability.  In a cooperative
bargaining environment, the extraction of the risk premium from the other party does not occur.24
C.  The Dynamics of the Benchmark Board Model
To study the dynamics of the benchmark model, we need to obtain analytical expressions
for yt from equation (7).  Let the per-period utility functions in equation (2) be given by:
(12)











Given these symmetric, linear utility functions, policy is a zero-sum game for the parties and the
value functions for each party are linearly dependent, with Vi(It) = A - Vj(It) where A is a
constant and j = 1-i.  It then follows that the set of acceptable candidates collapses to a unique
value of yt and is the one satisfying equation (4) with equality for both parties.
 Using (12) with (7) set to equality yields the equilibrium solution for the median voter in
period t (and xt) when both incumbents are present is given by:
18
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Setting ym,t = yt , then yt-1, and finally yt-2, we can solve for the equilibrium appointment
of yt.  Without loss of generality, let yt-1 £ yt-2.  The solutions for yt are:
                                                
18. The value functions (A2)-(A4) in Appendix A can be used to determine the equilibrium appointments that
would arise should one or both of the incumbents be missing at time t.25
(14)
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For yt-1 ³ yt-2 the inequalities in (14) are reversed.  To obtain the final reduced form solutions, the
expressions for the expected policy two periods from now, EtFt+2, must be inserted.  Again, this
expectation depends on the probabilities of electoral success for each party and the length of the
electoral cycle.  In the benchmark model with elections occurring every period we have EtFt+2 =
pq1 + (1-p)q0.  However, regardless of the process driving EtFt+2 the expressions in (14) are the
equilibrium appointment equations and thus will be used later when elections occur every 3
periods.26
Although they appear to be complicated, expressions (14a)-(14c) are fairly intuitive.  To
see this, let q1 = 1, q0 = 0, p = 1/2 which makes EtFt+2 = 1/2.   The type of board member
appointed today, and thus today's policy, depends on what the parties expect policy to be two
periods from now under winner-take-all relative to the board incumbents' policy preferences.  So,
for example, in (14a) if the expected policy two periods from now, EtFt+2 = 1/2, is between the
policy positions advocated by the board incumbents then today's appointee and policy is between
the incumbents position.  So if future policy is in the middle, neither party will let current policy
be driven away from the middle.  From (14b), if both incumbents are sufficiently to the right of
EtFt+2 = 1/2, then party 0 will not accept any appointee that drives policy further from the middle
and therefore today's appointee must be to the left of the incumbents.  With yt-1 £ yt-2, this makes
yt-1 the median voter.  The reverse is true for (14c).  Consequently, in the benchmark model, the
system of checks and balances tends to keep policy in the middle or drives it towards the
middle.
19  To get a flavor for the dynamics of the benchmark model, Figures 1A and 1B show
two simulated paths for xt for the parameter specifications above.  The figures reveal that,
regardless of whether the policy starts off high or low, it converges relatively fast to the steady
state (after approximately 14 periods).
A very surprising result forthcoming from the expressions in (14) is that, although there
is board turnover and an election every period, there is no policy certainty even off the steady-
state path!  In other words, there are no policy surprises or partisan business cycles at any time in
the benchmark model. The appointments given by (14) are made regardless of who is the
nominating party and, with EtFt+2 = pq1 + (1-p)q0, the expectation term in (14) does not depend
                                                
19. Proving formally that (14) is a stationary process is difficult since there are 3 separate second-order
difference equations of which only one holds each period. It can be shown that as long as .52138 < b and27
on the current nomination/confirmation state.  Consequently, the policy preferences of the
incumbents are all that is needed to determine who the next appointee will be and thus what the
next policy action will be.
20 Using this information, private agents can enter into contractual
arrangements without having to worry about who will be in power after the election, i.e., they do
not have to index wage contracts to election outcomes in order to protect themselves from policy
uncertainty.  A well-designed policy institution solves the problem for them.  On a final note,
this result illustrates that one cannot equate policy variability with policy uncertainty.  Even
though policy exhibits variability in the process of converging to the steady state, there is no
policy uncertainty since private agents know exactly what policy will be in every period.
To summarize the findings of the benchmark board model, an independent policy board
with discretionary powers will eliminate all policy uncertainty associated with electoral
uncertainty and produce a steady-state policy that is equivalent to a policy rule. The implication
is that, under the assumed conditions, a policy board will eliminate partisan business cycles and
produce a superior outcome to the Alesina winner-take-all model and improves upon the
Alesina-Rosenthal divided government model.  Furthermore, policy stability is achieved without
ignoring the policy desires of the current electorate, hence political accountability is maintained.
In the next section, we will examine how robust these results are when the key assumptions of
the benchmark model are relaxed.
                                                                                                                                                         
[(2-b
2)/2(1+b)]<a<b/(1-b) the necessary and sufficient conditions for stationarity of each individual second-order
difference equation will be satisfied.  While not a guarantee, this at least suggests that (14) is stationarity for a
reasonable parameter space.
20. This is essentially the same point made by Waller [1989] -- the incumbent set on the board contains
valuable information concerning the path of policy, thereby reducing the likelihood of a policy surprise following an
election. Of course, if there is any uncertainty regarding the parameters or preferences of the incumbents then this
result will break down.28
V.  Extensions of the Benchmark Model
The key assumptions of the benchmark board model are:
1.  Frequent elections or long board terms.
2.  Constant election probabilities.
3.  Linear utility.
4.  Perpetually divided government.
Without these assumptions it was shown that a steady-state appointee and policy would not exist.
Consequently, a policy board will not be able to produce the same outcome as a policy rule.
Nevertheless, it will be shown that a policy board still produces greater output stability than the
cases where the government directly sets policy.  In this section, the assumptions listed above
will be relaxed to see how each one affects the variability of policy relative to the non-board
policy regimes.
A.  Infrequent Elections or Short-Board Terms
The ultimate threat for each party in this bargaining game is to shut down the board and
let policy control revert back to the government.  The payoff from doing so depends on which
party is expected to hold the executive office when the board shuts down, EtFt+2.  Assume that
elections now occur every three periods, which is the same length as the board terms.  If an
election occurs between t and t+2, then EtFt+2 = pq1 + (1-p)q0.  But if an election does not occur
in the next two periods, whoever holds the executive office today will still be there in t+2 and
thus EtFt+2 = qi  if party i holds the executive branch in t.  As a result, if elections occur every
three periods and period t is an election period then EtFt+2 = qi, whereas Et+1Ft+3 = Et+2Ft+4 =
pq1 + (1-p)q0 in the last two periods of the electoral cycle.
Substituting these expressions into (14) we can see that, in the first period of the electoral
cycle, parties 0 and 1 will appoint individuals who are partisan in the sense that their policy
preferences are closer to the preferred policy of the nominating party.  Partisanship arises29
through the EtFt+2 = qi term.  When party 1 nominates in the first period after winning control of
the executive branch, it will appoint someone who is closer to party 1’s threat point q1 and vice
versa for party 0. Partisanship arises because of the nominating party's first-mover advantage.  In
the second and third periods the degree of partisanship is reduced since appointments will be
based on the expected value of the two parties threat points rather than the threat points
themselves.  Thus, consistent with Waller’s [1992] finding, appointments made immediately
after an election are partisan but become more moderate as the next election approaches. The
intuition behind this result is that, since elections can cause a reversal of roles, today’s
confirming party has more leverage in the bargaining process the closer is the next election. It
has the option to reject a nomination, hope to win the next election and nominate someone more
to its liking to fill the vacancy.  The current nominating party is aware of this increased incentive
to reject partisan nominations and opts to offer up more moderate nominees to ensure
confirmation.  Thus, the closer the next election, the more moderate is the appointee.
How is policy uncertainty affected by infrequent elections? With a three-period electoral
cycle and three-period board terms, there is a policy surprise in the period following the election
but in the second and third periods of the electoral cycle, no policy surprises occur. After roles
are established, private agents know which party will be nominating and can solve for the
median voter on the board with certainty in the second and third periods.  This result is consistent
with Alesina's [1987] rational partisan theory – elections create policy surprises immediately
after an election but once rational agents know which party will be nominating they can deduce
who will be appointed, and what the policy will be, in the latter part of an administration’s
term.
21
                                                
21. Clearly this result would change if unexpected resignations were incorporated into the model.30
More importantly, having policy set by the board creates smaller policy surprises than
either the Alesina [1987] or the Alesina-Rosenthal [1996] model. Without loss of generality,
assume that party 1 nominates in t-1 and wins re-election to the executive branch in period t.
Under the winner-take-all regime of the Alesina [1987] variety, the policy surprise is
) 1 ( 1 p x E x t t t - = - - .
In the Alesina-Rosenthal [1996] model of divided government the policy surprise would be
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With divided government and a policy board, the policy surprise will be of the form
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2) if yt = ym,t and l = b
2/(ab+b
2) otherwise.  Since 0 < l < 1 for
0 < a, b < 1, the policy surprise with the policy board is smaller than in either of the policy-by-
government models.
In order to get a better understanding of the dynamics of the model, simulations were run
and compared to the winner-take-all model.  Table 1 and Figures 2A - 2C depict the outcomes of
those simulations based on the parameter values a = .4, b = .9, q0 = 0, q1 = 1 and p = .45. The
simulations illustrate several interesting results.  First, policy is substantially smoother with the
board than the winner-take-all regime; its standard deviation is less than 1/4 of the winner-take-
all regime.  The low variability of policy is due to the moderation of appointments arising from
the bargaining structure of the appointment process and divided government.  Second, the
staggering of board terms leads to ‘smoother’ transitions; it induces something akin to a policy
‘cycle’ as opposed to ‘spikes’ in the setting of policy.  Third, Figure 2C reveals that the cycles
are asymmetric; when there is a change of power in the executive branch, policy moves sharply31
towards the preferred policy of the new administration as it makes partisan appointments to the
board.   However, if the incumbent party is reelected in the next election, it will be able to
continue pushing policy towards its preferred outcome through partisan appointments but the
gains will be much smaller than achieved after wresting control away from the opposition. In
short, there is a substantial ‘honeymoon’ period after an election in which the executive branch
changes hands and during this honeymoon period the new executive gets what it wants.  But the
honeymoon disappears in the latter part of the administration’s term and will not reappear to any
significant degree if the incumbent party is reelected.
Finally, Table 1 reveals that the appointee in the first period of the electoral cycle will not
typically be the median voter (if ever).  The reason is that this appointee is always the most
partisan, hence she will never tend to be in the middle.  The importance of this appointee is not
to actually set policy but to pull policy to one side or the other by acting as a policy threat point
should vacancies arise for the latter seats on the board.  To use a sports analogy, partisan first
period appointees are used to determine ‘field position’ whereas the second and third period
appointees do the actual ‘scoring’.
B.  Electoral Persistence
Up to this point it has been assumed that election probabilities are time-invariant.
However, there is often an incumbent bias whereby the party holding the executive branch is
likely to retain control.  Thus it is important to understand how incorporating time varying
election probabilities into the model affects the variability of policy.  To do this in a simple
fashion, assume that election probabilities can be modeled as a Markov chain with transition
matrix P. Under permanently divided government, the transition matrix for determining who












where pik is the probability party k, k=0,1, will nominate next period given that party i is
currently nominating. Each row of P sums to one. With this probability structure and elections
occurring every period, the expectation term in (14) is now given by EtFt+2 = piiqi + pijqj where i
denotes the nominating party in period t and j = 1 - i.
Even though elections occur every period, utility is linear and there is perpetually divided
government, there will now be policy surprises every period but the magnitudes are less than in
the policy-by-government models.  To demonstrate this, let P be symmetric with p00 = p11 ¹ 1/2,
q1 = 1, q0 = 0 and assume that party 1 is nominating in period t-1.  In the winner-take-all model,
the policy surprise is
) 1 ( 11 1 p x E x t t t - = - - .
After some tedious algebra, it can be shown that the policy surprise will be given by:
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2) if yt = ym,t and l = b
2/(ab+b
2) otherwise.  Since 0 < l < 1 for
0 < a, b < 1 and (2p11 - 1)
2 £ 1, the policy surprise with the board is again smaller than in the
winner-take-all model.  It can be shown that the same is true for the winner-takes-most model as
well.  The reasoning is that elections can change the nominating state and thus the path of
expectations thereby creating a surprise.  Taking the derivative of the expression above with p >
1/2 reveals that the further p11 is from 1/2, the greater is the surprise and the more volatile policy33
will be.
22  With pii > 1/2, the current nominating party is more likely to be in control of the
executive branch two periods from now and thus by shutting down the board is more likely to get
the policy it most prefers.  Hence, it uses this advantage to appoint more partisan board members
and this induces more variability in policy.  Figures 3A and 3B illustrate exactly this point.
Nevertheless, the variance of policy is still substantially lower than the policy-by-government
regimes.
Lengthening the board terms will lower the volatility of policy caused by electoral
persistence.  The further out is the payoff from shutting down the board the smaller is the
nominating party's advantage both through discounting and a smaller probability of retaining
control far into the future. Hence, policy variability and welfare can be improved by lengthening
board terms but at the cost of reducing political accountability.
C. Non-Linear Utility and Risk Aversion
Assuming linear utility allows for analytically tractable solutions.  But with linear utility,
the parties are risk neutral, consequently, they only care about the average level of policy and not
its variability.   This raises the question of why they would want to have policy smoothed in the
first place.  Hence, the assumption of risk aversion appears to be more relevant for studying a
policy board.  But imposing risk aversion requires the use of numerical methods to study the
behavior of policy and the equilibrium appointments.
Before embarking on such a path, it is worth conjecturing how risk aversion can alter the
results obtained in the linear case.  Risk aversion means that each party will be willing to pay a
premium to avoid uncertain outcomes which translates to a willingness to accept less preferable
candidates for the board today rather than create vacancies on the board and increase uncertainty
                                                
22. When p11=1/2 then p10 is also 1/2 and election outcomes are not state-contingent. With elections every
period and time invariant election probabilities, there will be no policy surprises.34
about the direction of future policy. Due to its first-mover advantage the nominating party acts as
the insurer; it offers to nominate a candidate today to fill a vacancy and reduce policy uncertainty
tomorrow. Only the nominating party can do so, the confirming party can only accept or reject
this “insurance” contract.
23  The confirming party pays for the reduction in uncertainty with a by
accepting a candidate closer to the nominating party’s preferred policy position.  Risk aversion
therefore leads to more partisan appointments which translate into larger movements in policy.
24
A further implication of the confirming party’s willingness to pay a risk premium is that
the average value of policy should be skewed towards the party with the greater long-run
probability of nominating.  By having a larger probability of nominating a party is more likely to
receive than pay the risk premium.  In the linear utility examples, the steady-state policy
outcome was x = y = pq1 + (1-p)q0. With risk aversion, p > 1/2 means party 1 will be the insurer
more often and so the average value of policy, x, should satisfy pq1 + (1-p)q0 < x < 1.  If p <
1/2, then the average value of policy should satisfy 0 < x < pq 1 + (1-p)q0.
To summarize, risk aversion is conjectured to have two effects on the equilibrium policy
path: 1) policy should be more variable, and 2) the average policy action will be biased towards
the preferred policy of the party with the greater probability of nominating members to the board.
To carry out the numerical simulation, the party utility functions were assumed to be of
the following CRRA form:
                                                
23. Recall that the nominating party has the choice not to nominate anyone.  By creating a vacancy tomorrow
and reducing the incumbent set, this makes policy more uncertain.
24. This immediately raises the issue that it is in a party’s best interest to portray itself as being risk neutral in












where 1 - g is the degree of relative risk aversion.
25
Figures 4A and 4B display numerical simulations of the model with elections occurring
every period, p = .45, q0 = 0, q1 = 1 and utility parameters equal to g = .9 and g = .6.  Figure 4A
reveals that if the parties are not too risk averse, policy will behave similar to the linear utility
case; on average, policy is close to party 1’s nomination probability (but slightly less) and there
is little variability in appointment types and thus policy.  Figure 4B shows that by increasing the
degree of risk aversion, policy variability increases and the average value of policy moves closer
to party 0’s preferred policy since p < 1/2 (they receive a greater risk premium on average). But
the fluctuations in policy are still substantially less than the winner-take-all case. Thus, risk
aversion will generate policy variability but the existence of the board still leads to substantial
smoothing of policy.
D.  Unified Government
A key assumption made in deriving (7)-(14) was that unified government did not occur.
This is clearly an unrealistic assumption; for example, in the period 1952-1996, the same party
controlled both the U.S. Presidency and the U.S. Senate in 22 of those 44 years.  For empirical
conformity, allowing one-party control of the nominating and confirming roles appears to be an
important extension of the model.
                                                
25. The model was also simulated under the assumption of CARA utility.  Though slightly different
quantitatively, the numerical results were essentially the same as the CRRA case.36
Given the assumptions regarding policy preferences, when one party controls both the
nomination and confirmation decision, appointees to the board will be extreme partisans (zeros
or ones).
26  Analytical solutions can be found when unified government is possible but require
many simplifying assumptions to yield tractable expressions.  Even then, the appointment type
for the divided government states looks very similar to (14).
The interesting feature of unified government is that purely partisan appointments will
create occasional policy “spikes” should one party maintain complete control for two periods.
But despite these spikes, how stable is policy the rest of the time and how large do the
probabilities of complete control have to be to create substantial policy variability?  Figures 5
and 6 display a simulation of the equilibrium appointees and policy actions with q0 = 0, q1 = 1
and, respectively, the following transition matrices:
(17) P =
... 4 4 5 .
... 4 4 5 .
.. 4 4 5 ..
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The rows of P correspond to today's control state while the columns refer to tomorrow's control
state.  The first row and column of P correspond to unified government under party 1's control,
the second row and column correspond to party 1 nominating and 0 confirming, the third row
and column is the opposite and the last row and column correspond to party 0 having unified
control.  As a result, p11 is the probability that party 1 retains unified government given that it
                                                
26. This is the appointment structure assumed in Waller [1989].37
currently has unified control, p12 is the probability that it retains the executive branch but loses
the legislative branch given that it currently has complete control and so on.  The values in (17)
yield a long-run probability of unified government of .02 (1 in 50); for (18) the long-run
probability of unified government is .20 (1 in 5).  The long-run probability of each party
nominating is 1/2.  Compared to the similar model shown in Figure 4A, Figure 5A shows that
policy will be more variable due to the possibility of unified government but not outrageously so.
A policy spike will only occur once every 2500 periods on average and in 200 periods none is
observed.  Figure 5B shows that policy will display significant variability even if the likelihood
of unified government is only 20%. In this simulation, policy spikes should occur every 25
periods or 8 times in 200 periods; there are 7 in the sample shown.  The conclusion is that it does
not take a large probability of one-party control to induce significant fluctuations in policy.
The key feature of one-party control is that policy will “spike” on occasion as a party
wins control of both nomination and confirmation for a two periods.  The spikes occur because
the party in power can ‘pack the board’ with partisan appointees.  However, to minimize the
possibility of board packing, society can simply lengthen board terms and increase the size of the
board.  Board packing then requires maintaining complete control of the government for long
periods of time, which is unlikely.  Hence, altering the institutional structure of the board
minimizes board packing and reduces the variability of policy.
VI.  Conclusions
As long as elections are unpredictable, there will be political risk and policy variability.
However, society is generally capable of devising institutional arrangements that reduce the
excessive fluctuations in policy arising from political competition.  Independent policy boards38
are in this category and the work presented here suggests that they should be relatively
successful at reducing if not eliminating electoral uncertainty while maintaining a significant
degree of political accountability.  While electoral uncertainty has been used as the source of
political risk, the results presented here should apply to other sources of political uncertainty.
The model developed in this paper provides a foundation for theoretical work on political
appointments in a world of political competition.  There are a number of interesting directions
for fruitful extensions of the model.  First, the benefits of elections need to be incorporated.
Only the costs of elections (policy uncertainty) have been modeled.  Garcia de Paso [1995]
argues that policy boards create a “democracy deficit” that needs to be considered in the optimal
design of policy boards and has done some work in this area.
A related issue, is that changes in political control reflect changes in the position of the
median voter in society.  If the change in the median policy preference is permanent, then policy
should move immediately to the new median position.  If the shift is temporary, then any policy
shift may simply create fluctuations in policy that are undesirable from a long-run perspective.
This latter view is consistent with the theme of this paper.  But if society cannot tell if the
outcome of the current election is a permanent or temporary shift in preferences, then it may well
choose to have policy set by an independent board whose members are political appointees
serving staggered terms. The issue then is what is the optimal term length for board members.
Work by Waller and Walsh [1996] on optimal term lengths for central bankers may be useful for
answering this question.  The model presented here suggests that making board terms slightly
longer than the electoral period may be optimal, ceteris paribus.  So if the electoral cycle is 4
years, have members of a three-member board serve 6-year terms.  Doing so is conducive to the
existence of a stable steady-state policy while allowing a high degree of political accountability39
by giving the executive the ability to turn the board over fairly soon if it wins a back-to-back
elections.
A third direction of research would be to change the theoretical structure to reflect the
design of “real world” policy boards.  For example, members of the U.S. Supreme Court serve
lifetime appointments, whose endpoints are uncertain. Also, some boards have members with
disproportionate influence on the setting of policy, such as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board.  Furthermore, some boards are 'mixed' with some members being political appointees
while other members are not.  This would characterize the Federal Open Market Committee of
the Federal Reserve which is composed of politically appointed Board Governors and non-
politically appointed regional Fed Presidents.  The Bundesbank also has a  'mix' of policy makers
since a majority of the Bundesbank Council members are appointed at the state level not the
federal level. Lohmann [1997] studies this institutional structure and finds that a board composed
of all federal appointees would reduce electoral uncertainty relative to the current Bundesbank
structure.  However, this result is obtained in a world in which appointees are assumed to be pure
partisans (0's or 1's). It is not clear how this result would change in the framework developed
here.
Another potentially useful extension would allow current policy to affect future election
probabilities.  This would make elections endogenous to some extent and may allow a merging
of appointment models with rational political business cycle models.
These extensions may well involve complicated models that do not yield analytical
solutions.  But, as has been demonstrated here, this should not be viewed as a hindrance to
research; numerical methods widely used in other areas of economics also can be used to study
dynamic political economy issues in new and interesting ways.40
Appendix A
With three board members, there are four possible incumbent states: It = (yt-1,yt-2),
(yt-1,Æ), (Æ,yt-2), (Æ,Æ).  Consequently, four values of yt are needed to solve the programming
problem, which in turn means that there are four versions of equation (4).
Acceptable candidates for each incumbent state must satisfy:
(A1)
Vy y u y E V y y u y y E V y it t t y i mt t it t t i t t t it t
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(A4) is the value function associated with the model without a board, hence it must be a strict
inequality.  Consequently, (A4) is equal to equation (5) in the text:
(A5) Vu E V it i t t it ,, (,) ( ) (,) ÆÆ = + ÆÆ + F b 1
where Ft = qi if party i nominates in t and qj if j = 1- i nominates.  Update (A5) one period, take
the resulting expression and substitute into (A3).  Update this version of (A3) one period to
obtain:
(A6) ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( 2 , 1
2
2 1 1 1 1 , Æ Æ + F + ³ Æ + + + + - - + t i t t i t t i t t i V E u E y u y V b b    .41
Use (A6) and (A1) to obtain the following inequality:
(A7)
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Update (A7) one period, take expectations dated at time t, multiple the expression by b and add
u(ym,t) to both sides to get the following inequality:
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Party i's acceptable candidates, yt,  must satisfy both (A7) and (A8).  However, when it is the
confirming party, party i will be offered its minimally acceptable candidate who satisfies one of
these expressions with equality.  If (A7) holds with equality, then (A8) must hold with equality
since it was obtained from (A7).  However, if (A8) holds with equality then it is possible for
(A8) to be strictly greater than (A7).  Thus, we obtain the following inequality that must be
satisfied for all acceptable candidates:
(A10)
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where we use the fact that  b
3Et[Vi,t+3(Æ,Æ) - ui(Ft+3) - bEt+1Vi,t+4(Æ,Æ)] = 0.  (A10) is equation
(7) in the text.42
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Period   Nomination Confirmation Appointee Policy
31 1 0 0.853 0.577
32 0.626 0.626
33 0.620 0.626
34 0 1 0.194 0.620
35 0.407 0.407
36 0.364 0.364
37 1 0 0.790 0.407
38 0.545 0.545
39 0.577 0.577
40 1 0 0.854 0.577
41 0.627 0.627
42 0.621 0.627
43 0 1 0.194 0.621
44 0.408 0.408
45 0.364 0.364
46 1 0 0.790 0.408
47 0.545 0.545
48 0.577 0.577
49 0 1 0.189 0.545
50 0.394 0.394
51 0.358 0.358
52 0 1 0.128 0.358
53 0.312 0.312
54 0.313 0.312
55 0 1 0.097 0.312
56 0.289 0.289
57 0.302 0.289





















Three member board, election every period.  200 period simulation.















Three member board, election every period.   200 period simulation
a = .4 b = .9 g = 1    p = .4546




















Three member board, elections every three periods.  100 period simulation
a = .4 b = .9 g = 1     p = .45






















































Three member board, election every period.  200 period simulation
a = .4 b = .9 g = 1 Mean (Ignoring the first 6 observations):  .5




















p11= p00 = .75      p01 = p10 = .25       Mean:  .510646      Standard Deviation:  .077
Long-run probability of party 1 nominating: .549















Three member board, election every period.   200 period simulation




















Three member board, election every period.   200 period simulation




















Three member board, election every period.   200 period simulation




















Three member board, election every period.   200 period simulation
a = .4 b = .9 g = .9          Mean:  .511376     Standard Deviation: .2533